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Abstract 
 
 
Theoretical research argues that convertible bonds mitigate the contracting costs of moral hazard, adverse 
selection, and financial distress.  Using firm-specific and macroeconomic factors of the contracting costs, 
we examine the extent to which they impact the likelihood of issuance and the structure of convertible 
bonds.  Our evidence indicates that moral hazard, adverse selection, and expected financial distress costs 
are all important determinants of the likelihood of issuing convertible bonds over straight bonds.  We also 
analyze the structure of convertible bonds issued by studying whether these bonds are more debt-like or 
equity-like.  The evidence indicates that moral hazard costs do not influence bond structure, while adverse 
selection costs are somewhat important in determining the structure.  Expected financial distress costs 
have the strongest statistical and economic impact on convertible bond structure. 
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1.  Introduction 
Convertible bonds are debt securities that offer the holder the option to convert the bonds 
into equity of the issuing firm.  The conversion feature offers the issuer a dimension of flexibility 
over straight debt, which prior theory research argues may be structured to mitigate contracting 
costs of moral hazard (Mikkelson, 1980; Green, 1984), adverse selection (Brennan and Kraus, 
1987; Brennan and Schwartz, 1988; Stein, 1992), and financial distress (Stein, 1992).   
Empirically, these theories imply a systematic variation in the use and design of convertible 
bonds with measures of these contracting costs.   
In this paper, we examine the extent to which contracting costs arising from moral 
hazard, adverse selection, and financial distress affect the likelihood and structure of convertible 
bonds.  Using firm-specific factors that capture these costs, and macroeconomic factors that 
capture the time-series variation in the costs, we first determine the likelihood of convertible 
issuance over straight bonds.  We then analyze the impact of these contracting costs on the 
structure of convertible bonds.  Convertible bonds offer flexibility of design along two main 
dimensions – the level of post-conversion equity attached to each bond, and the time to maturity 
of the bonds.  The probability of the conversion option being in the money is a function of these 
features, and is our measure of the structure of the convertible bond.  We use the Black-Scholes 
option pricing model to estimate this probability of conversion.  This probability of conversion 
indicates the debt-like or equity-like nature of the convertible and represents the effective 
flexibility afforded by the bond. 
The incremental contributions of our research are two-fold.1  First, we separate out the 
                                                 
1 Prior research on convertibles has mainly analyzed (i) the announcement reaction and the factors affecting the 
reaction (e.g. Dann and Mikkelson, 1984; Mikkelson and Partch, 1986; Eckbo, 1986; Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward, 
1999), and (ii) the optimal call policy and the differences between underwritten and non-underwritten calls of 
convertibles (e.g. Dunn and Eades, 1989; Asquith and Mullins, 1991; Singh, Cowan, and Nayar, 1991). 
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different theories of convertible bond issuance by categorizing them in terms of contracting costs 
of moral hazard, adverse selection, and financial distress.  This allows us to study the relative 
empirical impact of each cost.  Second, our analysis controls for time-series variation in 
measures of these costs by using macroeconomic factors.  There have been a number of studies 
that highlight the importance of controlling for time-series heterogeneity in the contracting costs 
when studying security issuance decisions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Choe, Masulis, Nanda, 
1993; Gertler and Hubbard, 1993; Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1996; Pulvino, 1998; Levy, 2001; 
Korajczyk and Levy, 2002).  Because macroeconomic factors such as interest rates, industry 
performance, economic growth, and the level of information asymmetry in the market affect cash 
flows, the type and quality of the investment opportunity set, risk perceptions, and the 
probability of default, they capture the time-series variation in the costs that arise due to moral 
hazard, adverse selection, and financial distress. 
Our results indicate that the likelihood of issuing convertible bonds compared to straight 
bonds is higher for high growth firms, smaller firms, firms with high levels of information 
asymmetry, and firms with high asset specificity.  These results suggest that firms use the 
flexibility provided by convertible bonds to mitigate contracting costs of moral hazard, adverse 
selection, and financial distress.  We also find that firms are more likely to issue convertibles 
over straight bonds during periods of high interest rates, and during industry and economic 
downturns.  This highlights the importance of financial distress costs in the issue decision since 
in these periods the probability of default is higher (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Pulvino, 1998) 
and investment opportunities deteriorate (Choe, Masulis, and Nanda, 1993).  
When we focus only on convertible bonds and examine the variation in the probability of 
conversion, our results indicate that this probability is higher (convertible bonds are more equity-
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like) for smaller firms, during periods of high interest rates, and during economic downturns.  
Issuing equity-like convertibles in these cases allows firms to reduce the fixed claim component 
of convertibles, thereby reducing the probability of default.  We also find that the probability of 
conversion is lower (convertible bonds are more debt-like) for firms with high firm-specific 
information asymmetry.  However, this result is not robust to macroeconomic measures of 
adverse selection costs suggesting that there is only weak evidence of adverse selection costs 
influencing convertible bond structure.  Moral hazard costs are not significant in determining 
convertible bond structure.   
The economic impact of the variables also reiterates the importance of all three 
contracting costs in determining whether or not firms issue convertibles.  But, once firms decide 
to issue convertibles, the structure of the convertibles is influenced largely by financial distress 
considerations.  In fact, consistent with Stein (1992), our evidence shows that financial distress 
costs are so important for some firms that they structure convertibles to mitigate these costs even 
at the expense of incurring some adverse selection costs. 
2. Structure of Convertible Debt 
A convertible bond may be viewed as a combination of two securities -- a straight bond 
and a warrant.  In designing convertibles, several features in the security differentiate these 
bonds from straight debt and equity, and provide flexibility to the issuers.  For instance, the 
conversion ratio, the number of shares offered upon conversion, implicitly determines the 
conversion price and the level of post-conversion equity available to the bondholders upon 
conversion.  The conversion price in conjunction with time to maturity and other firm-specific 
factors, determines the probability of the conversion option being in the money, which in turn is 
a minimum condition for the bond to be converted into equity.  A high (low) probability of 
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conversion indicates a convertible that is more “equity-like” (“debt-like”).  We use the 
probability of conversion as our metric of the structure of convertibles. 
Following Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (1999), we measure the probability of conversion 
of a convertible bond by the risk-neutralized probability that the bond will be converted into 
equity.  We estimate this probability under the assumptions of the Black-Scholes option pricing 
model and by utilizing the pricing equation in Merton (1973) for the call option of a firm that 
provides a continuous dividend yield.  Hull (1999) shows that N( d2 ) in the option pricing 
equation represents the ex-ante probability that the option will be exercised in a risk-neutral 
world, where N(•) is the cumulative probability under the standard normal distribution and 
d2 = ln(S/X)+ (r -  div -  σ
2 / 2)T
σ T . 
In the above equation, S is the price of the firm’s stock on the convertible bond filing 
date, X is the conversion price, r is the risk-free rate calculated as the continuously compounded 
annual yield on 10-year T-bonds in the filing month, div is the continuously compounded 
dividend yield during the fiscal year preceding the filing date, σ  is the standard deviation of the 
continuously compounded equity return estimated over the period 240 to 40 trading days prior to 
the filing day, and T is the number of years until maturity.  The probability of conversion 
estimated this way may be interpreted as the anticipated equity-like or debt-like nature of the 
convertible bond at the time of issue.  
3.  Factors Affecting the Likelihood and Structure of Convertible Debt 
There are several theoretical explanations for the use of convertible bonds by firms.  
These theories typically analyze the incremental benefits of convertible over non-convertible 
debt, and identify factors that affect the likelihood of convertible debt issuance over straight debt.  
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In addition, the theories exploit the design flexibility afforded by convertible bonds and so, offer 
empirical implications for the structure of the convertible bond issued.   
We consider only the choice between straight debt and convertible debt, and do not 
include other financing choices such as equity in our likelihood analysis for several reasons.  
Schneider and McCarthy (1999) point out that, at issuance, all of the proceeds of convertible 
debt are classified as “entirely debt.”  In terms of market value of debt, King (1984) estimates 
that about 82% of the market value of a convertible comes from its straight debt component, and 
only about 18% comes from the equity component.  Moreover, convertible debt remains 
classified as debt until conversion into common stock or maturity.  Finally, even theories of 
convertibles that consider straight debt, convertible debt, and equity in their choice (Brennan and 
Kraus, 1987; Brennan and Schwartz, 1988; Stein, 1992) typically derive the optimality of 
convertibles by first excluding equity in favor of straight debt, and then deriving convertibles as 
an alternative to straight debt under conditions that make straight debt unfavorable.  Thus, these 
theories implicitly derive choice between straight debt and convertibles only.  
3.1. Contracting Costs of Moral Hazard 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that shareholders of a levered firm have an incentive 
to undertake riskier projects, because they have unbounded upside potential for future cash flows 
but face only bounded downside potential due to limited liability.  This is the risk-shifting 
problem.2  However, bondholders anticipate this misincentive and demand a higher yield as 
compensation for this risk, thereby imposing the cost of risk-shifting on the shareholders.   
Green (1984) demonstrates that convertible bonds mitigate the risk-shifting problem.  By 
attaching a conversion option to the bonds, firms issuing convertibles allow the bondholders to 
                                                 
2 This problem is also illustrated in Galai and Masulis (1976) who view a levered firm’s equity as a call option on 
the firm’s underlying assets.  By substituting riskier assets for assets of lower risk, shareholders can increase the 
volatility of the firm’s assets, thereby increasing the value of their shares. 
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participate in the upside potential.  Thus, convertible bonds reduce the value of limited liability, 
thereby mitigating the risk-shifting problem.  A similar argument is also presented in Mikkelson 
(1980,1981).  He argues that when convertible bonds are called back, shareholder incentives are 
altered to favor risk-shifting.  For firms issuing debt, Mikkelson’s argument and Green’s model 
imply that firms with greater propensity to shift risk onto bondholders would have a higher 
likelihood of issuing convertible debt over straight debt, and would offer more potential equity 
participation via the conversion option as a commitment to abstaining from risk-shifting. 
Convertible bonds may also mitigate the underinvestment problem outlined in Myers 
(1977).  In firms with relatively large fixed liabilities, since shareholders receive only cash flows 
that remain after paying off the liabilities, they will accept only projects whose NPV exceed the 
liabilities.  As a result, managers will forego some positive NPV projects.  Because this incentive 
is rationally anticipated by the bondholders at the time of the issue, the costs of underinvestment 
are imposed on the shareholders.  Adapting the arguments developed by Mayers and Smith 
(1987), for a given value of debt, the fixed component of the debt is smaller in convertibles than 
in straight bonds, due to the warrants attached to the convertibles.  The higher is the value 
provided by the conversion option, the lower will be the fixed income component (the coupon) 
of the convertibles, thereby mitigating the underinvestment problem.  Thus, firms with greater 
potential underinvestment problems would issue convertible bonds with higher probability of 
conversion.  Overall, the implications of these studies is that firms which have higher moral 
hazard problems will have a higher likelihood of issuing convertible debt over straight debt, and 
the convertibles they issue will be structured to offer a higher probability of conversion. 
3.2. Contracting Costs of Adverse Selection 
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that under information asymmetry firms would first rely 
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on debt, then equity when they raise external capital because debt securities are less information 
sensitive than equity and so are associated with lower adverse selection costs.  Extending this 
argument to include convertible debt would suggest that convertibles, being more equity-like 
than straight debt, would have higher adverse selection costs.  In a related vein, under 
information asymmetry, Kim (1990) shows that a higher conversion ratio in convertibles (i.e., 
more equity-like convertibles) convey expectations of poor future earnings.  This would imply 
that firms with higher levels of information asymmetry would prefer to issue straight debt over 
convertible debt.  Also, when firms issue convertibles, the convertibles will be more debt-like as 
information asymmetry increases. 
In a Myers-Majluf type framework, Stein (1992) develops a model that trades off the 
adverse selection cost of equity against the financial distress cost of debt to obtain conditions 
under which convertible debt is an optimal financing choice.  He argues that under information 
asymmetry, firms would prefer to issue debt over equity.  But for firms with high expected 
financial distress costs, debt would be sub-optimal since it exacerbates these costs.  These firms 
would therefore prefer convertible debt since the option component of convertibles lowers the 
fixed component for these firms.  In contrast to the implication of Myers and Majluf, Stein’s 
model implies that for firms with high financial distress costs, the likelihood of convertible bond 
issuance is increasing in information asymmetry.  Also, controlling for financial distress costs, 
the convertibles are likely to be more debt-like as information asymmetry increases in order to 
mitigate adverse selection costs. 
Brennan and Kraus (1987) and Brennan and Schwartz (1988) argue that convertible 
bonds constitute an ideal financing vehicle for firms subject to high information asymmetry 
especially about the riskiness of their assets.  They show that unlike straight debt or equity, 
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which are both undervalued under information asymmetry, optimally structured convertible 
bonds are less likely to be undervalued.  They demonstrate that convertible bond values are 
relatively invariant to risk perceptions because the mispricing in the debt component is offset by 
the mispricing in the option component.  If the market incorrectly perceives a firm’s risk to be 
higher (lower) than what it truly is, the debt component of the convertibles would be undervalued 
(overvalued), while the option component will be overvalued (undervalued) since option values 
are positively related to risk.  Because the adverse selection problem in straight debt or equity is 
higher under higher levels of information asymmetry, their argument implies a higher likelihood 
of convertible bond issuance under higher information asymmetry.  
3.3. Financial Distress Costs 
The results of a recent survey of corporate executives by Graham and Harvey (2001) 
indicate that executives view expected financial distress costs and credit rating as important in 
the debt issue decision.  Castanias (1983) finds evidence that ex-ante default costs force firms to 
hold less debt in their capital structure.  Titman (1984) also argues that firms with higher 
expected financial distress costs would have less debt in their capital structure.  Therefore, Stein 
(1992) argues that firms with high financial distress costs would prefer equity over debt to 
mitigate financial distress costs.  However, if these firms also face high adverse selection costs 
due to information asymmetry, then equity is not a viable option.  Stein’s model implies that 
under high adverse selection costs, firms with high expected financial distress costs would have a 
higher likelihood of issuing convertibles over straight debt.  Also, when they issue convertibles, 
the bonds will be structured to mitigate the high financial distress costs faced by the firms, and so 
will be more equity-like.  Thus, Stein’s model derives a balance between financial distress costs 
and adverse selection costs in determining convertible structure. 
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4.  Variable Definitions 
In our analysis, we include firm-specific variables measuring moral hazard, adverse 
selection, and financial distress costs.  However, Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993), Gertler and 
Hubbard (1993), Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996), and Korajczyk and Levy (2002) argue that 
macroeconomic factors cause time-series variation in the contracting costs because they affect 
cash flows, the type and quality of the investment opportunity set, risk perceptions about firms, 
and the likelihood of financial distress.  Therefore, in addition to firm-specific factors, we 
include macroeconomic factors to control for time-series heterogeneity in the costs. 
4.1. Moral Hazard 
 Smith and Watts (1992), Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993), and Barclay and Smith 
(1995) argue that the contracting costs of underinvestment and risk-shifting are higher for firms 
with more growth options because the conflict between shareholders and bondholders over the 
exercise of the options is greater for these firms.  Shareholders of high growth firms can more 
easily substitute riskier projects for less risky ones and are also more susceptible to foregoing 
positive NPV projects if the gains accrue predominantly to the bondholders.  So, growth 
opportunities represent a measure of moral hazard problems.  We measure growth opportunities 
using the market to book ratio of assets for each firm, measured at the end of the fiscal year prior 
to the convertible debt announcement year.  The market value of the firm is defined as the book 
value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity. 
4.2. Adverse Selection 
Following Dierkens (1991) and Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), we use the 
dispersion in the market-adjusted daily stock returns in the year preceding the issue 
announcement as a measure of firm-specific information asymmetry.  This proxy relies on the 
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assumption that stock price movements not explained by market movements are due to firm-
specific information, and that at least some of this information is known to the managers but not 
to the outside investors.3  Thus, higher is the dispersion in stock returns, higher is the level of 
information asymmetry about the assets of the firm in the market. 
Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) and Eisfeldt (2004) argue that adverse selection costs 
are counter-cyclical and hence lower during market upturns.  We proxy market upturns using 
industry performance and economic growth.  We measure economic growth using annual GNP 
growth rates, where the GNP figures are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bulletin.  Because 
our regressions use both GNP growth rates and interest rates (as a measure of expected financial 
distress costs), two potentially correlated variables, we orthogonalize GNP growth and interest 
rates and use the residuals from this regression.4  This enables us to capture the impact of 
economic performance on the debt issue decision that is incremental to the impact of interest 
rates.5  Real GNP is measured in 1996 dollars, and real interest rate is defined as the nominal 
monthly 10-year T-bond yield deflated by the change in the monthly Consumer Price Index.  To 
measure industry upturns and downturns, we define industry performance as the median annual 
stock return in the issuing firm’s industry in the year prior to the filing of the debt issue.  For 
each debt-issuing firm, industry is defined as all firms with the same 3-digit SIC code. 
Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) argue that the level of information asymmetry in the 
market varies through time, and periods of low information asymmetry occur when “events 
                                                 
3 To the extent that some of the stock price movements are due to industry-wide (and not market-wide) information 
that is a surprise to both the managers and the outside investors of the firm, this variable would overstate the level of 
information asymmetry about a firm.  There is, however, no bias in the overstatement across the firms. 
4 We orthogonalize GNP growth and interest rates by regressing real GNP growth rates on contemporaneous real 
interest rates (i.e., using GNP growth rate as the dependent variable), and using the residuals from this regression.  
We choose to regress GNP growth rates on interest rates in the orthogonalization because Estrella and Hardouvelis 
(1991) argue that real interest rates drive GNP growth.  Because high real interest rates affect investment levels, this 
would decrease real output, which in turn reduces GNP growth rates. 
5 We also performed all our analysis using real GNP growth rates as the measure of economic growth.  Our results 
are qualitatively similar to the results using the GNP residuals. 
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known by both managers and investors dominate firm value.”  They argue that since equity 
issues convey unfavorable information to the market, firms will choose to issue equity during 
periods of low information asymmetry when the adverse selection costs are lower.  Hence, as 
documented in Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) and Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996), aggregate 
volume of equity issues is an indicator of the level of information asymmetry in the market.6  We 
use aggregate equity volume in the economy to capture time-series heterogeneity in adverse 
selection costs.  The Federal Reserve Bulletin provides monthly reports of the aggregate dollar 
volume of equity issued by all firms in the economy in nominal dollar terms.  We use this 
estimate deflated by the change in the monthly Consumer Price Index in our analysis.7 
4.3. Financial Distress 
Titman (1984) and Titman and Wessels (1988) argue that expected bankruptcy costs are 
higher for firms with unique products since their liquidation costs are likely to be high. 
Following Titman and Wessels (1988) and Fisher, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989), we represent 
expected bankruptcy costs with an indicator variable asset specificity that is one for firms in the 
machinery and equipment industry (SIC code between 3400 and 3999) and zero otherwise.  This 
variable captures the costs incurred during distress but does not measure the probability of being 
in distress.  In tables not reported here, we use the interest coverage ratio as an alternate variable, 
to analyze the impact of the probability of distress on the likelihood of issuance and structure of 
                                                 
6 It could be argued that high equity volume might simply reflect “hot” markets for equity when other 
macroeconomic conditions are favorable for equity issue so that equity prices are high during these periods.  
However, Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) show that periods classified as hot versus cold using equity prices and 
general macroeconomic conditions in the market, do not coincide with the periods of high equity volume.  They 
conclude that aggregate equity volume contains information regarding time-varying adverse selection costs, and is 
not just a manifestation of hot equity markets (see pages 265 and 266).  
7 We also orthogonalized equity volume against GNP growth and interest rates by regressing real equity volume on 
GNP growth rates and real interest rates, and using the residuals from this regression to measure market information 
asymmetry.  All our results are virtually identical to the results using real equity volume.  These results are available 
from the authors upon request. 
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convertible bonds.8  In addition to these two variables, we also use macroeconomic variables 
described below that capture the time-series variation in both the probability of default and the 
costs of being in default. 
The survey evidence in Graham and Harvey (2001) indicates that corporate executives 
view interest rate timing as the most important determinant of the debt issue decision.  When 
firms issue debt at higher levels of interest rates, and the firms’ cash flows do not increase 
proportionally, a higher fraction of the firms’ cash flows go towards servicing the debt.  This 
increases the likelihood of financial distress and hence the expected distress-related contracting 
costs of debt.  We therefore use the level of interest rate to capture the time-series variation in the 
probability of distress.  We proxy real interest rates using the yield on 10-year Treasury bonds as 
of the filing month of the straight and convertible bond issues, deflated by the change in the 
Consumer Price Index.  The T-bond yields are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bulletin.  
In addition to capturing variation in adverse selection costs, economic growth and 
industry performance (defined in the previous section) could also reflect expected financial 
distress costs.  Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) argue that there are fewer and poorer quality 
investment opportunities during economic downturns compared to upturns, and hence higher 
probability of distress associated with debt issued in downturns.  Shleifer and Vishny (1992) 
argue that expected distress costs are higher for firms during industry downturns due to increased 
                                                 
8 The interest-coverage ratio measures a different aspect of expected financial distress costs, the probability of 
financial distress.  Our inferences are not altered when we use this measure of expected financial distress costs in the 
place of asset specificity.  Altman’s Z score is an alternative and commonly used measure of the short-term 
probability of distress.  It is calibrated so that higher scores represent lower probability of distress.  While this also 
seems to be a good measure to capture the probability of distress, there are two reasons why we prefer to use interest 
coverage ratio over the Z-score.  First, the Z-score is computed as a function of various firm-specific variables that 
capture financial distress probability.  We use some of these variables (e.g., financial slack, market-to-book ratio) 
separately in our analysis because they are motivated by some theories of convertibles, and using the Z-score in 
addition to these variables will lead to multi-collinearity in our regressions.  Second, Altman’s Z score is not 
available for many of our observations, and using it results in significant data loss.  We therefore prefer to use 
interest coverage ratio to capture the probability of distress while controlling separately for other variables (that are 
used in the computation of Z-score). 
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asset illiquidity during these periods.  Their argument stems from the fact that it is usually 
companies in the same industry that bid the highest price for assets during liquidations, and the 
costs of being in distress will be higher when the bidding firms themselves are not performing 
well.  Thus economic growth and industry performance also proxy for expected financial distress 
costs with the costs being higher in downturns.9 
4.4. Control Variables 
 We include two firm-specific control variables in our regressions, firm size and financial 
slack.  Firm size is measured as total assets obtained from Compustat.  Brennan and Schwartz 
(1988) argue that adverse selection costs are higher for smaller firms.  This is in part driven by 
the fact that smaller firms are typically younger, have smaller analyst followings, and are also 
less likely to be held by large mutual funds because they are often not part of any well-known 
stock indices.  Brennan and Schwartz (1988) also argue that expected financial distress costs are 
higher for smaller firms.  Larger firms are typically better diversified and have a lower 
probability of being in distress (Rajan and Zingales, 1995).  The theories relating financial 
distress and adverse selection costs to convertible bonds both imply a negative relation between 
firm size and the likelihood of convertible bond issuance.  The impact of firm size on the 
probability of conversion however, is mixed.  To the extent that firm size captures distress risk, 
we would expect smaller firms (firms with higher distress risk) to issue more equity-like 
convertibles in order to limit the fixed liability, and hence the expected distress costs.  To the 
extent that firm size captures adverse selection costs, we would expect convertible bonds of 
smaller firms to be more debt-like in order to reduce the adverse selection costs associated with 
the equity component. 
                                                 
9 Pulvino (1998) shows that bankruptcy costs increase during downturns for firms in the airline industry. 
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Financial slack is measured as (Operating income before depreciation-Capital 
expenditures-Change in net working capital-Net taxes-Change in deferred taxes)/Total assets in 
the fiscal year prior to the announcement year.  Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory provides a 
rationale to control for financial slack.  Because of the potential for default, straight debt forces 
managers of firms with high financial slack (free cash flow) to focus on debt management rather 
than (mis)use the cash for alternate private purposes, thus bonding the incentives of managers 
with the incentives of shareholders.  We would therefore expect firms with high financial slack 
to rely more on straight debt rather than on convertible debt. 
5.  Data and Empirical Results 
5.1. Sample Characteristics 
The data consists of convertible and straight debt issues completed during the period 
1983 to 2002 by companies trading on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq.  We require that all 
issues have filing dates recorded in the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database and data be 
available for the issuing firms on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database.  
We eliminate debt issues by utilities and financial companies since the motivations for issues by 
these companies may be regulation related (i.e., to show evidence of cost of capital), and since 
there may be implicit government subsidization of the distress costs for these firms.  The sample 
consists of 704 convertible debt issues and 2544 straight debt issues by industrial firms.  Table 1 
shows the annual distribution of the issues.  The minimum number of debt filings in the sample 
in any given year is 10 (in 1999 and 2000) for convertibles, and 33 (in 1983) for straight debt 
issues.  The maximum number of filings is 113 (in 1986) for convertibles and 222 (in 1992) for 
straight debt issues. 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the data.  Issuers of convertible and straight 
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debt differ on several characteristics.  The average straight debt issuer in our sample is over six 
times larger than the average convertible debt issuer in terms of total assets.  This difference is 
even larger in the medians.  Thus, convertible debt is typically issued by firms that are much 
smaller than their counterparts that issue straight debt.  The average straight debt issuer has about 
33% debt in their capital structure, while the average convertible issuer has only about 27% debt.  
Thus, counter to the common misconception that convertibles are issued by highly levered 
companies, we find that these firms actually have lower debt ratios than straight debt issuers.  Of 
course, this finding has to be tempered by the ability of the issuers to support straight or 
convertible debt.  And, we find that convertible issuers have negative financial slack while 
straight debt issuers have positive financial slack in the median.  Thus, the comparisons indicate 
so far that convertible issuers have a poorer ability to support debt in their capital structure than 
straight debt issuers, and this may account for the lower debt ratio of convertible issuers.   
The market to book ratio of the issuers indicates the growth opportunities of the 
convertible issuers to be somewhat higher than that of the straight debt issuers.  In addition, the 
fraction of plant, property, and equipment relative to total assets is much higher for straight debt 
issuers than for convertible issuers.  These two results suggest perhaps that convertible issuers 
have more of their value determined by growth opportunities than straight debt issuers.  Finally, 
convertible issuers have more information asymmetry on average than straight debt issuers, as 
measured by the dispersion in the market-adjusted daily stock returns. 
The straight and convertible debt issues also differ along several features.  While the 
mean and median size of the debt issue is much smaller (about 147 million and 60 million 
respectively) for convertible bonds compared to straight bonds (about 599 million and 250 
million respectively), the size of the offering relative to firm size is much larger for convertibles 
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(about 43% and 30% respectively) than for straight debt (about 14% and 10% respectively).  
Coupled with the fact that convertible issuers have negative slack, the large issue size relative to 
firm size of the convertible issues indicates that these issues may have very high default risk.  
Also, over 85% of convertible issues are rated as speculative grade or are unrated compared to 
only about 40% of straight debt, again suggesting that convertible issues are riskier than straight 
debt.  The median maturity of convertible bonds is about 20 years while it is only 10 years for 
straight bonds.  Also, because of the additional value provided to the investors through the 
conversion option attached to the convertibles, the average coupon rate on convertibles is lower 
than that on straight bonds. 
A predominant fraction of convertible debt (93%) is subordinated debt, while this 
fraction is substantially lower for straight debt (15%).  Finally, while the majority of straight debt 
issues in our sample are through shelf registered offerings, the majority of convertible issues 
(93%) are placed traditionally.  Rule 415 that regulates shelf registration of securities imposes 
eligibility criteria for firms desiring to shelf register securities.  Only firms satisfying a size 
requirement, whose debt has investment grade rating, and who have not defaulted on any claims 
during the preceding three years are eligible to shelf register their securities (Shyam-Sunder, 
1991).  Since convertible bond issuers are small firms, with high levels of information 
asymmetry, and debt that is rated speculative grade, they may not be able to shelf register the 
convertible debt.  Table 2 shows that the ex-ante probability of conversion over the life of the 
bond is about 29%.  
Consistent with earlier studies on security issues, we estimate significant cumulative 
abnormal returns of –1.585% for convertibles and –0.326% for straight debt in the 3-day interval 
(-1,+1) around the announcement.  Thus, convertible bond announcements are on average 
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associated with a significantly more negative abnormal returns than straight debt announcements.  
5.2. Likelihood of Convertible Bond Issuance 
In Table 3, we present the results of logistic regressions of the likelihood of convertible 
bond issuance over straight bonds.  The dependent variable in these regressions is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of 1 for convertible issues and 0 for straight debt issues.10  Panel A 
presents the impact of only the macroeconomic variables, while panel B presents the impact of 
the macroeconomic and firm-specific variables on the likelihood of issuing convertibles.  The 
results in panel A indicate that the coefficient of interest rates is positive and significant, and the 
coefficient of industry performance is negative and significant in all the regressions.  Also, the 
coefficients of economic growth and equity volume are negative and significant.  Collectively, 
these results suggest that convertibles are more likely to be issued in periods of the 
macroeconomy when expected financial distress costs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Andrade and 
Kaplan, 1998; Choe, Masulis, and Nanda, 1993; Pulvino, 1998), and adverse selection costs are 
high (Brennan and Schwartz , 1988; Stein, 1992). 
The economic impact of each variable provides some measure of the relative magnitude 
of each effect.  Consistent with the survey evidence in Graham and Harvey (2001), Panel A of 
Table 3 indicates that high interest rates have by far the most impact on the likelihood of 
convertible issuance, followed by economic downturns.   In regression 1, for a one quartile 
increase in interest rates from the median, the probability of issuing convertible over straight 
debt increases to about 61% from a median probability of 17.6% (an increase of 43.5 percentage 
points).  In regression 2, an equivalent decrease in economic growth increases the probability of 
issuing convertible over straight debt to about 46% from a median probability of 20% (an 
                                                 
10 We applied a 2% winsorization to each tail for all our independent variables so as to minimize the impact of 
potential outliers. 
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increase of 26 percentage points).  The other two variables, equity volume and industry 
performance, are associated with about a 3.6 percentage point change on average in the 
probability of issuing convertibles over straight debt. 
These results are reinforced in the regressions in panel B of Table 3 when we include 
firm-specific measures of the contracting costs.  All of the firm-specific factors are significant in 
the logistic regressions.  The coefficient of market-to-book ratio, the proxy for growth 
opportunities, is positive and significant in all the regressions.  This is consistent with the 
argument in Mikkelson (1980) and Green (1984) that firms that have a higher propensity for 
risk-shifting and underinvestment use convertibles to mitigate the contracting costs of moral 
hazard.  Also, firms with higher asset specificity have a higher likelihood of issuing convertibles 
over straight bonds, to mitigate the higher expected financial distress costs.  Firms with higher 
firm-specific information asymmetry have a higher likelihood of issuing convertibles, as 
indicated by the positive coefficient of dispersion in stock returns.  Finally, firm size is negative 
and significant, indicating that smaller firms have a higher likelihood of issuing convertibles. 
When we examine the economic impact of the firm-specific variables, firm size has the 
highest impact, followed by market-to-book ratio and dispersion in stock returns.  For example, 
in regression 7, a change in each variable from its median by one quartile in the direction of 
increasing probability, increases the probability of issuing convertibles by 26.5, 21, and 21 
percentage points respectively, from a median probability of issue of 14.5%.  The 
macroeconomic variables retain their statistical and economic significance in the regressions.  
Overall, these results are consistent with all three contracting costs (moral hazard, adverse 
selection, and financial distress) driving the choice of security.  However, the economic impacts 
indicate that financial distress costs are the most important. 
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5.3. Switch Hitters versus Non-switch Hitters 
 In panel A of table 4, we examine a subsample of firms that have at different times issued 
convertible and straight debt.  Because of their demonstrated ability to issue both types of debt, 
we refer to these firms as switch hitters.    There are 173 switch hitters in our sample that issue a 
total of 638 straight and convertible debt over the sample period.  In panel A of the table, we 
analyze the determinants of the likelihood of convertible bond issuance over straight debt for 
these firms.  Our results indicate that none of the firm-specific variables except firm size are 
important determinants of the likelihood of issuing convertibles.  The macroeconomic variables 
interest rate and economic growth are significant in all the regressions, and equity volume is 
significant in some of the regressions.  The results suggest that firms issue convertibles when 
they are smaller, and during periods of high interest rates, poor economic growth, and high 
information asymmetry.  The results are consistent with these firms switching from straight debt 
to convertible during periods when the contracting costs of financial distress and adverse 
selection are high and vice versa.  The fact that in the above regressions, mainly macroeconomic 
variables (except for firm size) are significant highlights the importance of macroeconomic 
variables in capturing time-series variation in the contracting costs and hence, the switch 
decision.   
We also analyze the likelihood of convertible bond issuance for non-switch hitters in 
panel B of the table.  In regressions 1, 2, and 3 in panel B, we include an indicator variable that is 
1 for firms that have issued only straight debt prior to the current issue, and 0 otherwise.  In 
regressions 4, 5, and 6, we include an indicator variable that is 1 for firms that have issued only 
convertible debt prior to the current issue, and 0 otherwise.  The indicator variable for only prior 
straight debt issuers is negative and significant in regressions 1, 2, and 3, and the indicator 
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variable for only prior convertible debt issuers is positive and significant in regressions 4, 5, and 
6.  This suggests that firms are more likely to issue the same type of security that they have 
issued in the past.  In all of these regressions, all the firm-specific and macroeconomic variables 
are significant.  The significance of the firm-specific factors here and their non-significance in 
the switch hitter subsample suggests that firm-specific variables are sticky and characterize firm-
type across time, but because they do not change much over time, they are unable to explain the 
switch decision. 
5.4. Determinants of the Probability of Conversion 
 The theories of convertible bonds also have implications for the probability of conversion 
of the bonds.  The probability of conversion represents the equity-like or debt-like nature of a 
convertible bond.  In Table 5, we present univariate comparisons of the proportion of equity-like 
convertibles across different periods of the macroeconomy.  In the univariate comparisons, we 
first classify periods into high and low periods of each macroeconomic variable, and compare the 
proportions of equity-like convertibles across these extreme periods.  For interest rate, economic 
growth, and equity volume, we first obtain 3-month moving averages of each variable and then 
classify these moving averages into quartiles.  Then, in each month and for each variable, we 
assign the variable to one of the four quartiles depending on the magnitude of the variable that 
month.  If three consecutive months of a variable are classified in the highest (lowest) quartile, 
we define those periods as high (low) periods of the macroeconomy for that variable.  For 
industry performance, a high (low) period is when the median annual stock returns of the firm’s 
industry is above (below) the sample median. 
The results indicate that the proportions of equity-like convertibles relative to all equity-
like convertibles, and relative to all convertibles in our sample are higher during periods of high 
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interest rates.  These results suggest that firms use more equity-like convertibles during periods 
when the likelihood of distress and hence, the expected distress costs are higher.  We also find 
the proportion of equity-like convertibles to be lower (i.e., more convertibles are debt-like) 
during periods of higher economic growth.  This is consistent with the implications of Choe, 
Masulis, and Nanda (1993) that in periods when expected financial distress costs are lower, firms 
do not feel a strong need to limit fixed claims by trading off with equity participation.  Finally, 
counter to the implications of adverse selection arguments, we find that firms issue more equity-
like convertibles during periods of high information asymmetry.  We analyze this last result in 
greater detail later in the section. 
 We also perform a regression analysis of the determinants of the probability of 
conversion.  The regression results are presented in Table 6.  Again, panel A presents the impact 
of only the macroeconomic factors, while panel B presents the impact of the macroeconomic and 
firm-specific factors.  The dependent variable in these regressions is the probability of 
conversion of the convertible bonds.  Our evidence in panels A and B strongly support the 
argument that convertibles are structured to mitigate financial distress costs.  We find only weak 
evidence that convertible bond structure is affected by adverse selection costs, and find no 
evidence of bond structure being affected by moral hazard costs.  In fact, consistent with Stein 
(1992), our evidence shows that financial distress costs are so important for some firms that they 
structure convertibles to mitigate these costs even at the expense of incurring some adverse 
selection costs. 
The results in panels A and B indicate that convertible bonds are more equity-like during 
periods of high interest rates and during economic downturns.  The coefficient of interest rate is 
positive and significant, and the coefficient of economic growth is negative and significant in the 
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regressions.  These results are consistent with expected financial distress costs determining the 
structure of the convertibles.  Firms exhibit a greater propensity to limit their fixed claims by 
including more equity in their convertibles during periods when financial distress costs are high.  
The coefficient of firm size is negative and significant, indicating that smaller firms, i.e., firms 
more susceptible to distress risk, structure their convertible to be less debt-like.  In panel B of 
table 6, the coefficient of market-to-book ratio is not statistically significant.  Thus, moral hazard 
problems do not affect the structure of convertibles even though concerns of moral hazard drive 
the security choice decision.   
The coefficient of dispersion in stock returns, our measure of firm-specific information 
asymmetry, is negative and significant in the regressions.  This is consistent with the argument 
that firms with higher information asymmetry structure their convertibles to be more debt-like in 
order to mitigate the adverse selection costs of equity-like instruments.  However, the coefficient 
of equity volume, the other adverse selection cost related variable, does not support the view that 
adverse selection costs affect bond structure.  The coefficient of equity volume is negative and 
significant, which suggests that convertibles are more equity-like during periods of low equity 
volume – that is, during periods of high information asymmetry.  This indicates that firms are 
willing to issue equity-like convertibles, and incur the increased adverse selection costs during 
periods of high information asymmetry.  In fact, this result also reiterates our finding in the 
univariate test in table 5.   
Our finding about the relation between convertible bond structure and equity volume, 
may also be viewed as firms avoiding debt-like convertibles during high information asymmetry 
periods.  Although from an adverse selection cost point of view this result is counter-intuitive, it 
may be that these equity-like convertibles issued during high information asymmetry periods are 
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predominantly intended to mitigate financial distress costs (as in Stein, 1992) rather then adverse 
selection costs.  In other words, periods of high information asymmetry may coincide with 
periods of higher financial distress costs, and firms do not want to issue debt-like convertibles 
due to these latter costs, even if it means that they incur some adverse selection costs.  Also, if 
this conjecture were true we would expect the negative relation between equity volume and 
probability of conversion to be even more negative for financially distressed firms.   
To examine whether the above result is driven by a concern of financial distress costs, we 
first compute the correlation between equity volume and interest rates.  Consistent with the 
conjecture above we find the correlation to be a statistically significant – 0.5687.  Thus, periods 
of low equity volume (i.e., high information asymmetry) do indeed coincide with periods of high 
interest rates (periods of higher expected financial distress costs). We also pursue this line of 
inquiry by including an interaction term, asset specificity * equity volume, in our regressions.  
Given the negative correlation between equity volume and interest rates, if our results are driven 
by firms issuing convertibles to mitigate financial distress costs rather than adverse selection 
costs, we would expect to see more equity-like convertibles during periods of high information 
asymmetry especially for the high distress firms.  That is, we would expect the coefficient of the 
interaction term to be negative.  In regression results not reported in the tables, the interaction 
term is indeed negative and significant in the various specifications of the regressions.11  
 We also examine the economic impact of the variables in our regressions.  We find that 
although the magnitude of impact of each variable differs, financial distress costs have a 
significant economic impact on convertible bond structure.  When interest rates increase by one 
quartile from the median and economic growth decreases equivalently, the probability of 
conversion increases by 14.52 percentage points (panel B, regression 2) and 6.03 percentage 
                                                 
11 These regressions are available from the authors upon request. 
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points (panel B, regression 3) respectively from their median probability of conversion of about 
30%.  A one quartile decrease in firm size has an even bigger economic impact, an increase in 
the probability of conversion by 48 percentage points, again illustrating the importance of 
financial distress costs.12 
6.  Conclusion 
Theoretical studies argue that convertible bonds can be structured to mitigate contracting 
costs of moral hazard (Mikkelson, 1980; Green, 1984), adverse selection (Brennan and Kraus, 
1987; Brennan and Schwartz, 1988; and Stein, 1992), and expected financial distress (Stein, 
1992).  In this paper, we examine the extent to which the theories of moral hazard, adverse 
selection, and financial distress affect the likelihood of issue and structure of convertible bonds.  
Using firm-specific factors that capture these contracting costs, and macroeconomic factors that 
capture the time-series variation in the contracting costs, we first determine the likelihood of 
convertible issuance over straight bonds.  We then analyze the impact of these contracting costs 
on the structure of convertible bonds.  We represent the structure of convertibles using the ex-
ante probability of the conversion option being in the money.  This probability of conversion 
incorporates the key design elements of the bond, indicates the debt-like or equity-like nature of 
the convertible, and represents the effective flexibility afforded by the bond. 
                                                 
12 About 95% of all convertibles issued in our sample period are also callable.  The call feature on convertibles is 
typically included to facilitate forcing conversion of these bonds into equity.  In the context of our empirical 
analysis, the call feature of convertibles has two implications.  First, the call feature may force the bonds to be 
converted into equity much earlier than voluntary conversion suggests, thereby making the convertible “more 
equity-like” than is captured in the probability of conversion.  Second, callable convertibles often include call 
protection periods, which may extend the “debt-like” nature of the convertibles even if the threat to call becomes 
credible.  To control for the potential impact of callability and the call protection period, we repeat our analysis of 
the probability of conversion while controlling for the call protection period of the bonds.  For non-callable bonds, 
this variable is set equal to the maturity of the bonds.  The call protection period variable is negative and significant 
in the regressions suggesting that the protection period makes the convertibles more debt-like in structure.  All our 
other results for the structure of the convertible are qualitatively similar to the results in table 6 of the paper.  Thus, 
our evidence suggests that the call feature does not alter any of our other results.  
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Using the convertible and straight bond issues completed by industrial firms during the 
1983 – 2002 period, we find that moral hazard, adverse selection, and expected financial distress 
costs all influence the likelihood of firms issuing convertibles over straight bonds.  The 
likelihood of issuing convertibles is greater for firms with higher moral hazard, adverse 
selection, and expected financial distress costs, such as high growth firms, smaller firms, firms 
with high levels of information asymmetry, and firms with high asset specificity.  We also find 
that firms are more likely to issue convertibles during periods of high interest rates, and during 
industry and economic downturns, periods when expected financial distress costs are higher.  
The economic impact of the variables in the likelihood regressions indicate that moral hazard, 
adverse selection, and expected distress costs are all economically significant with distress costs 
having the highest impact. 
When we examine the structure of the convertibles issued, our evidence strongly supports 
the argument that convertibles are designed to mitigate financial distress costs.  Convertibles are 
more equity-like during periods of high interest rates and during economic downturns.  Also, 
smaller firms issue more equity-like convertibles suggesting that mitigation of distress risk is a 
concern for these firms.  We find only weak evidence that convertible bond structure is affected 
by adverse selection costs.  Firms with higher levels of firm-specific information asymmetry 
issue more debt-like convertibles in order to mitigate the adverse selection costs of equity-like 
securities.  However, this result does not hold up when we use macroeconomic measures of 
adverse selection costs.  We actually find, counter to the implication of adverse selection cost 
arguments, that convertibles issued during periods of high information asymmetry are more 
equity-like.   
On further analysis, we find that this result is driven by firms for whom expected 
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financial distress cost is a large concern.  Thus, consistent with Stein (1992), our evidence shows 
that financial distress costs are so important for these firms that they structure convertibles to 
mitigate these costs even at the expense of incurring some adverse selection costs.  Finally, 
moral hazard costs do not affect the structure of convertibles even though concerns of moral 
hazard drive the security choice decision. 
Overall, our results indicate that all three contracting costs are important in determining 
whether or not firms issue convertibles.  Once firms decide to issue convertibles, the structure of 
the convertibles is influenced largely by financial distress considerations.  
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 Table 1 
Annual Distribution of the Straight and Convertible Debt Offerings 
 
The sample consists of straight and convertible debt offerings completed during the period 1983-2002 by industrial 
companies trading on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq.  We require that all issues have filing dates recorded in the 
Securities Data Corporation database. 
 
 Straight Debt Issues  Convertible Debt Issues 
Year of Filing Frequency 
Number of 
Firms 
 
Frequency 
Number of 
Firms 
1983 33 32  36 36 
1984 56 51  39 39 
1985 99 90  78 77 
1986 93 90  113 113 
1987 53 53  69 69 
1988 68 64  14 14 
1989 83 69  40 40 
1990 85 77  27 27 
1991 126 110  25 25 
1992 222 196  55 55 
1993 207 192  53 53 
1994 141 130  16 16 
1995 163 154  22 22 
1996 163 151  28 27 
1997 170 155  30 30 
1998 100 97  14 14 
1999 182 169  10 10 
2000 138 132  10 10 
2001 206 190  11 10 
2002 156 147  14 14 
      
Total 2544 2349  704 701 
 
Total number 
of unique firms 
1262 
 
 603 
 
 Table 2 
Summary Statistics of Firm and Issue Characteristics 
 
The sample consists of straight and convertible debt offerings filed by industrial companies between 1983-2002.  
Panel A presents the mean and median values of the continuous descriptive measures.  Total assets are obtained 
from Compustat as of the fiscal year end preceding the filing date.  Total debt is the sum of long-term debt and debt 
in current liabilities as of the fiscal year end preceding the filing date.  Market to book ratio is the ratio of (book 
value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity) to book value of assets.  Plant, property and 
equipment is obtained from Compustat in the fiscal year end prior to the filing date, and is measured millions of 
dollars.  Dispersion in stock returns is computed as the standard deviation of the stock returns of the issuing firm in 
days –240 to –40 relative to the filing date of each debt issue.  Financial slack is measured as the ratio of (operating 
income before depreciation minus capital expenditures minus change in net working capital minus net taxes minus 
change in deferred taxes) to total assets and is measured in the fiscal year end prior to filing year.  Size of the debt 
issue is the principal amount of the debt issued, and is obtained from SDC.  Maturity of debt issue is the number of 
years from offer date to final maturity.  Coupon rate is as specified in SDC.  Conversion premium is computed as 
percentage by which the conversion price exceeds the market price of the stock, measured relative to the market 
price of the stock as of close of the day prior to the filing date.  Call protection period is the number of years when 
the bond cannot be called back, and is obtained from SDC.  Probability of conversion is the risk-neutralized 
probability that the bond will be converted into equity at maturity.  Panel B presents the number and percentage of 
observations included in each issue characteristic classification for the debt issues.  Non-subordinated debt is debt 
that ranks above existing debt of the company in terms of security or collateral, and is obtained from the SDC 
database.  Moody’s rating of the issues and the type of registration are all obtained from the SDC filing statements.  
Panel C presents the mean (median) cumulative abnormal returns around the filing date of the debt issues.  
Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model parameters estimated over a 255 days ending 46 days 
before the filing of the debt issue and cumulated over the days in each event window.  The CRSP value-weighted 
index is used in the market model to compute betas. 
 
PANEL A:  Firm and Issue Characteristics - Continuous Variables 
 Straight Debt  Convertible Debt 
Descriptive Measure Mean Median  Mean Median 
Total Assets ($ million) 8657.06 2842.00  1309.43 210.05 
Total Debt/Total Assets (%) 33.22 30.28  27.81 25.36 
Market to Book Ratio  1.93 1.45  2.14 1.56 
Plant, Prop. & Equip./Total Assets (%) 41.98 38.23  34.34 28.67 
Dispersion in Stock Returns (%) 2.45 2.11  2.90 2.64 
Financial Slack (%) - 0.60 2.92  - 8.04 - 3.18 
Size of Debt Issue ($ million) 599.10 250.00  146.72 60.00 
Size of Debt Issue/Total Assets (%) 33.93 12.77  42.77 29.46 
Maturity of Debt Issue (years) 13.52 10.00  16.86 19.95 
Coupon Rate (%) 8.88 8.45  7.43 7.25 
Conversion Premium (%) - -  21.84 21.89 
Call Protection Period (years) 0.00 0.00  3.05 3.00 
Probability of Conversion (%) 0.00 0.00  28.68 28.68 
 
 Table 2 (continued) 
 
 
PANEL B:  Issue Characteristics - Indicator Variables 
Descriptive Measure Classification Number (%) of Observations 
  Straight Bonds Convertible Bonds 
Non-subordinated 2156 (84.70) 52 (7.39) 
Seniority of the Issue 
Subordinated 387 (15.22) 652 (92.61) 
    
Baa and above 1535 (60.36) 105 (14.91) 
Ba and below 781 (30.71) 416 (59.09) Moody’s Rating 
Not Rated 227 (8.93) 183 (25.99) 
    
Shelf 1212 (63.36) 50 (7.31) 
Registration Type 
Traditional 701 (36.64) 634 (92.69) 
    
 
 
PANEL C:  Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Event Window 
Straight Debt 
(%) 
Convertible Debt 
(%) 
Difference 
(%) 
(-3, +3) 
- 0.447a 
(- 0.350)a 
- 2.080a 
(- 1.795)a 
1.633a 
(1.445)a 
(-1, 0) 
- 0.147b 
(- 0.254)a 
- 0.951a 
(- 0.889)a 
0.804a 
(0.635)a 
(0) 
- 0.133b 
(- 0.161)a 
- 0.729a 
(- 0.513)a 
0.596a 
(0.352)a 
(0,+1) 
- 0.311a 
(- 0.258)a 
- 1.363a 
(- 1.268)a 
1.052a 
(1.010)a 
(-1, +1) 
- 0.326a 
(- 0.334)a 
- 1.585a 
(- 1.714)a 
1.259a 
(1.380)a 
 
a, b, c represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 Table 3 
Analysis of the Choice between Straight and Convertible Debt 
 
The sample consists of straight and convertible debt offerings completed during the period 1983-2002 by industrial 
companies trading on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq.  We require that all issues have filing dates recorded in the 
Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database.  The table presents the logistic regression analysis of the impact of 
economy-wide and firm-specific variables on the choice of debt type.  The dependent variable is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of 1 for convertible debt and zero for straight debt.  Panel A presents the analysis using 
only the economy-wide variables as independent variables, while panel B presents the analysis using both economy-
wide and firm-specific factors.  The interest rates variable is the 10-year T-bond rate prevailing in the filing month 
deflated by the monthly Consumer Price Index.  Economic growth is measured as the residuals from the regression 
of real GNP growth rates on real interest rates, where real GNP is measured in 1996 prices, and real interest rate is 
the nominal 10-year T-bond yield deflated by the Consumer Price Index.  Equity volume is measured as the 
aggregate dollar volume of equity (in millions) issued in the filing month deflated by the Consumer Price Index.  
Industry performance is the median returns of the firm’s industry in the filing year.  Firm size is the total assets of 
the firm as of the fiscal year end prior to filing date.  Dispersion in stock returns is the standard deviation of the 
issuing firm’s stock returns in days –240 to –40 relative to the filing date of the issue.  Asset specificity is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for firms in the machinery and equipment industry (SIC code between 
3400 and 3999) and zero otherwise.  Market-to-book ratio is measured as the ratio of (book value of assets – book 
value of equity + market value of equity) to the book value of assets as of the fiscal year end prior to filing date.  
Financial slack is the ratio of (operating income before depreciation - net taxes - change in deferred taxes) to total 
assets as of the end of the fiscal year end prior to filing.  Chi-squared statistics are presented in parentheses.  a, b, c 
represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.  The economic impact of each variable is 
presented as a percentage in italics.  The economic impact of each variable is computed as the increase in the 
probability of issuing convertible bonds for a change in the independent variable from its median to either the 25th or 
75th percentile (whichever leads to an increase in the probability), holding all other variables at their median.  The 
overall probability of issuing convertible bonds based on each regression model is also presented below each 
regression, and is computed at the median for all the variables.  
 
 Table 3 (continued) 
 
 
PANEL A:  Impact of Economy-wide Factors on the Likelihood of Issuing Convertible Bonds 
 Regressions 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Intercept 
- 3.6965 
(447.583) 
- 0.9787 
(338.777) 
- 0.7335 
(60.182) 
- 1.2233 
(791.093) 
- 3.6493 
(72.740) 
- 0.8138 
(70.2563) 
Interest Rates 
0.3279
a
 
(216.750) 
43.5361 
   
0.3239
a
 
(44.008) 
34.4976 
 
Economic Growth  
- 5.2321
a
 
(69.572) 
26.1981 
  
- 0.4341 
(0.107) 
1.0016 
- 5.3837
a
 
(47.0684) 
26.8612 
Equity Volume   
- 0.0114
a
 
(38.946) 
11.7014 
  
- 0.0025 
(1.2931) 
2.9476 
Industry 
Performance 
   
- 0.3422
b
 
(7.994) 
3.8003 
- 0.3033
b
 
(4.746) 
3.4206 
- 0.3318
b
 
(5.8558) 
3.7029 
       
Prob. of Issuing 
Convertible (%) 
17.6277 19.7991 22.1550 22.6237 19.7685 20.6681 
Likelihood Ratio 224.7784
a
 90.0311
a
 42.4236
a
 16.3956
a
 195.4790
a
 111.0542
a
 
Concordant 
Responses 
68.90% 66.80% 56.60% 51.60% 68.10% 66.40% 
N 3249 3090 3249 3084 2970 2970 
 Table 3 (continued) 
 
 
PANEL B:  Impact of Economy-wide and Firm-specific Factors on the Likelihood of Issuing Convertible Bonds 
 Regressions 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Intercept 
- 1.9637 
(53.237) 
- 5.4332 
(143.044) 
- 1.9680 
(50.762) 
- 1.4572 
(26.413) 
- 1.8981 
(45.771) 
- 1.6104 
(30.666) 
- 5.0700 
(59.134) 
Firm Size 
- 0.2200
a
 
(63.365) 
32.0302 
- 0.1600
a
 
(43.045) 
24.1902 
- 0.2100
a
 
(55.004) 
30.7486 
- 0.2100
a
 
(60.986) 
30.3521 
- 0.2500
a
 
(62.132) 
35.4626 
- 0.2000
a
 
(55.006) 
28.7161 
- 0.1900
a
 
(44.402) 
26.4468 
Dispersion in 
Stock Returns 
20.2110
a
 
(7.112) 
12.7533 
35.7995
a
 
(19.533) 
25.0287 
25.0983
a
 
(10.075) 
16.2682 
26.7715
a
 
(11.886) 
17.1104 
21.0227
a
 
(7.300) 
13.3823 
28.8127
a
 
(12.941) 
18.5930 
31.9852
a
 
(14.591) 
21.2995 
Asset 
Specificity 
0.6353
a
 
(19.649) 
0.0000 
0.6273
a
 
(17.240) 
0.0000 
0.6353
a
 
(18.295) 
0.0000 
0.6106
a
 
(17.514) 
0.0000 
0.5730
a
 
(15.387) 
0.0000 
0.6278
a
 
(17.545) 
0.0000 
0.5853
a
 
(14.401) 
0.0000 
Market-to-Book 
Ratio 
0.3243
a
 
(13.415) 
13.5002 
0.4929
a
 
(27.837) 
22.4741 
0.3920
a
 
(18.0344) 
16.7982 
0.3827
a
 
(17.898) 
16.0364 
0.3452
b
 
(13.900) 
13.9497 
0.4261
a
 
(20.802) 
18.1155 
0.4831
a
 
(24.264) 
20.9837 
Financial Slack 
- 1.5034
a
 
(12.365) 
8.2007 
- 1.2566
a
 
(8.028) 
7.2252 
- 1.6053
a
 
(12.593) 
8.7894 
- 1.5300
a
 
(12.332) 
8.3328 
- 1.7103
a
 
(14.175) 
8.8412 
- 1.6640
a
 
(13.230) 
9.0106 
- 1.3682
a
 
(8.401) 
7.3775 
Interest Rates  
0.3702
a
 
(101.602) 
48.9462 
    
0.3496
a
 
(29.766) 
43.6316 
Economic 
Growth 
  
- 4.1470
a
 
(26.443) 
20.6843 
  
- 2.7515
a
 
(12.858) 
13.2083 
0.3192 
(0.0392) 
0.6073 
Equity Volume    
- 0.0159
a
 
(32.534) 
16.8005 
 
- 0.0120
a
 
(15.767) 
13.0880 
 
Industry 
Performance 
    
- 0.3260
c
 
(3.097) 
3.9148 
 
- 0.3418
c
 
(2.579) 
4.2394 
        
Prob. of Issuing 
Convertible (%) 
17.2804 12.6937 15.4826 17.4411 17.9051 16.4307 14.4505 
Likelihood 
Ratio 284.4722
a
 395.1019
a
 307.6377
a
 320.4180
a
 300.6469
a
 324.2760
a
 371.2664
a
 
Concordant 
Responses 
79.70% 82.80% 81.70% 80.50% 80.50% 81.30% 82.90% 
N 1835 1835 1724 1835 1737 1724 1660 
 Table 4 
Choice between Straight and Convertible Debt for Switch and Non-Switch Hitters 
 
The sample consists of straight and convertible debt offerings completed during the period 1983-2002 by industrial 
companies trading on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq.  We require that all issues have filing dates recorded in the 
Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database.  The table presents the logistic regression analysis of the impact of 
economy-wide and firm-specific variables on the choice of debt type.  The dependent variable is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of 1 for convertible debt and zero for straight debt.  Panel A presents the analysis for 
issues made by a subsample of switch hitters, while panel B presents the analysis for the whole sample but 
controlling for non-switch hitters.  Switch hitters are defined as firms that have issued both straight and convertible 
debt prior to the current issue, while non-switch hitters are firms that have issued only straight debt or convertible 
debt prior to the current issue.  The interest rates variable is the 10-year T-bond rate prevailing in the filing month 
deflated by the monthly Consumer Price Index.  Economic growth is measured as the residuals from the regression 
of real GNP growth rates on real interest rates, where real GNP is measured in 1996 prices, and real interest rate is 
the nominal 10-year T-bond yield deflated by the Consumer Price Index.  Equity volume is measured as the 
aggregate dollar volume of equity (in millions) issued in the filing month deflated by the Consumer Price Index.  
Industry performance is the median returns of the firm’s industry in the filing year.  Firm size is the total assets of 
the firm as of the fiscal year end prior to filing date.  Dispersion in stock returns is the standard deviation of the 
issuing firm’s stock returns in days –240 to –40 relative to the filing date of the issue.  Asset specificity is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for firms in the machinery and equipment industry (SIC code between 
3400 and 3999) and zero otherwise.  Market-to-book ratio is measured as the ratio of (book value of assets – book 
value of equity + market value of equity) to the book value of assets as of the fiscal year end prior to filing date.  
Financial slack is the ratio of (operating income before depreciation - net taxes - change in deferred taxes) to total 
assets as of the end of the fiscal year end prior to filing.  Prior Straight Debt is an indicator variable that is 1 if the 
firm has issued only straight debt prior to the current issue, and is 0 otherwise.  Prior Convertible Debt is an 
indicator variable that is 1 if the firm has issued only convertible debt prior to the current issue, and is 0 otherwise.  
Chi-squared statistics are presented in parentheses.  a, b, c represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively. 
 Table 4 (continued) 
 
 
PANEL A:  The Likelihood of Issuing Convertible Bonds for the Subsample of Switch Hitters 
 Regressions 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Intercept 
- 0.5973 
(1.766) 
- 3.1251 
(16.149) 
- 0.5805 
(1.545) 
- 0.1560 
(0.104) 
- 0.4913 
(1.096) 
- 0.5218 
(1.086) 
Firm Size - 0.0700
a
 
(13.673) 
- 0.0500
a
 
(8.576) 
- 0.0600
a
 
(9.129) 
- 0.0700
a
 
(12.517) 
- 0.0800
a
 
(11.883) 
- 0.0600
a
 
(9.138) 
Dispersion in 
Stock Returns 
11.8240 
(0.591) 
17.0216 
(1.151) 
16.0051 
(0.992) 
15.8402 
(1.031) 
10.1936 
(0.419) 
16.3851 
(1.035) 
Asset 
Specificity 
0.2523 
(0.885) 
0.1715 
(0.382) 
0.1771 
(0.400) 
0.1985 
(0.535) 
0.1655 
(0.364) 
0.1739 
(0.386) 
Market-to-Book 
Ratio 
- 0.0876 
(0.214) 
0.1175 
(0.346) 
0.1053 
(0.252) 
- 0.0105 
(0.003) 
- 0.0638 
(0.108) 
0.1074 
(0.262) 
Financial Slack 
- 1.0288 
(1.172) 
- 0.6158 
(0.396) 
- 0.4575 
(0.181) 
- 0.9042 
(0.878) 
- 1.1762 
(1.324) 
- 0.4589 
(0.182) 
Interest Rates  0.2770
a
 
(16.556) 
    
Economic 
Growth 
  - 8.3352
a
 
(17.674) 
  - 7.9439
a
 
(11.889) 
Equity Volume    - 0.0139
a
 
(7.272) 
 
- 0.0019 
(0.109) 
Industry 
Performance 
    
- 0.0092 
(0.004) 
 
       
Likelihood 
Ratio 26.8200
a
 44.5692
a
 45.1935
a
 34.6983
a
 24.9901
a
 45.3030
a
 
Concordant 
Responses 
69.50% 72.80% 72.80% 70.30% 69.80% 72.60% 
N 378 378 366 378 353 366 
 
 Table 4 (continued) 
 
 
PANEL B:  The Likelihood of Issuing Convertible Bonds Controlling for Non-Switch Hitters 
 Regressions 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Intercept 
- 4.2854 
(39.436) 
- 1.2914 
(19.394) 
- 1.4948 
(26.960) 
- 5.2462 
(61.977) 
- 1.6860 
(33.109) 
- 1.8865 
(43.113) 
Prior Straight Debt - 1.0008
a
 
(29.2381) 
- 1.2432
a
 
(47.158) 
- 1.2189
a
 
(44.111) 
   
Prior Convertible 
Debt 
   0.7136
a
 
(14.211) 
0.6163
a
 
(11.154) 
0.6356
a
 
(11.769) 
Firm Size - 0.1400
a
 
(24.508) 
- 0.1300
a
 
(27.017) 
- 0.1600
a
 
(28.127) 
- 0.2000
a
 
(45.781) 
- 0.2100
a
 
(56.616) 
- 0.2400
a
 
(58.312) 
Dispersion in Stock 
Returns 
26.2385
a
 
(9.676) 
22.3493
a
 
(7.586) 
18.4387
b
 
(5.108) 
33.0613
a
 
(15.400) 
29.6363
a
 
(13.546) 
24.6457
a
 
(9.222) 
Asset Specificity 0.5597
a
 
(12.805) 
0.5995
a
 
(15.327) 
0.5351
a
 
(12.174) 
0.5788
a
 
(13.902) 
0.6182
a
 
(16.844) 
0.5532
a
 
(13.408) 
Market-to-Book 
Ratio 
0.4525
a
 
(20.860) 
0.4026
a
 
(18.007) 
0.3698
a
 
(14.753) 
0.4792
a
 
(23.575) 
0.4220
a
 
(20.179) 
0.3847
a
 
(16.186) 
Financial Slack - 1.2794
a
 
(7.243) 
- 1.5184
a
 
(10.775) 
- 1.3965
a
 
(8.915) 
- 1.3179
a
 
(7.722) 
- 1.6292
a
 
(12.612) 
- 1.4735
a
 
(10.105) 
Interest Rates 0.2949
a
 
(19.697) 
  0.3593
a
 
(30.796) 
  
Economic Growth 
0.0675 
(0.002) 
- 2.5742
a
 
(12.596) 
- 3.6223
a
 
(23.030) 
0.1845 
(0.013) 
- 2.9409
a
 
(14.298) 
- 4.5687
a
 
(27.203) 
Equity Volume  - 0.0104
a
 
(11.919) 
  - 0.0120
a
 
(15.681) 
 
 
Industry 
Performance 
- 0.3472
c
 
(2.702) 
 - 0.3613
c
 
(3.184) 
- 0.3341 
(2.453) 
 - 0.3508
c
 
(2.941) 
       
Likelihood Ratio 402.899
a
 377.387
a
 366.948
a
 384.920
a
 335.001
a
 329.077
a
 
Concordant 
Responses 
83.10% 81.80% 82.40% 83.30% 81.70% 82.80% 
N 1660 1724 1660 1660 1724 1660 
 
 Table 5 
Frequency Distribution of Equity-like Convertible Bonds  
 
The sample consists of convertible debt offerings completed during the period 1983-2002 by industrial companies 
trading on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq.  We require that all issues have filing dates recorded in the Securities 
Data Corporation (SDC) database.  The table presents the distribution of equity-like convertible bonds across 
different periods of the economy-wide variables.  Convertible bonds are classified as equity-like if their probability 
of conversion is above the median probability of conversion.  The table presents the proportion of all equity-like 
convertibles in each classification of the economy-wide variables, as well as the proportion of all convertibles that 
are equity-like.  We define high (low) interest rate periods as those 3-month periods where each of the three 10-year 
T-bond yields fall in the highest (lowest) quartile of the moving average of 10 year T-bond yields.  We use the real 
T-bond yield defined as the nominal rate deflated by the monthly Consumer Price Index.  We use the monthly 
residuals from the regression of real GNP growth rates on real interest rates to measure economic growth.  Real 
GNP is measured in 1996 dollars.  We define periods of high (low) economic growth as those 3-month periods 
where each of the three GNP residuals fall in the highest (lowest) quartile of the moving average of residuals.  We 
define industry performance as high (low) if the median annual returns of the firm’s industry is above the median of 
the sample.  We define a firm’s industry as all firms with the same 3-digit SIC codes as the issuing firm.  We define 
high (low) information asymmetry periods as at least three contiguous months where the aggregate real volume of 
equity issued falls in the upper (lower) quartile of the three-month moving averages of the aggregate equity volume.  
Real equity volume is defined as monthly dollar equity volume deflated by the monthly Consumer Price Index. 
 
Variable  
Number of equity-
like convertibles 
 
Number of equity-
like convertibles in 
each group ÷ All 
equity-like 
convertibles in 
sample 
Number of equity-
like convertibles in 
each group ÷ All 
convertibles in each 
group 
High 78  36.62% 62.40% 
Interest Rates 
Low 8 3.76%  21.62% 
     
High  17 7.98% 31.48% 
Economic Growth 
Low 67  31.46% 68.37% 
     
High 116 54.46% 54.72% 
Industry Performance 
Low  97 45.54%  45.54% 
     
High 52 24.41%  71.23% Information 
Asymmetry Low  20 9.39% 41.67% 
  
 Table 6 
Regression Analysis of the Probability of Conversion 
 
The sample consists of convertible debt offerings completed during the period 1983-2002 by industrial companies 
trading on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq.  We require that all issues have filing dates recorded in the Securities 
Data Corporation (SDC) database.  The table presents the regression analysis of the impact of economy-wide and 
firm-specific variables on the probability of conversion.  The dependent variable is the risk-neutralized probability 
of conversion for convertible bonds.  Panel A presents the analysis using only the economy-wide variables as 
independent variables, while panel B presents the analysis using both economy-wide and firm-specific factors.  The 
interest rates variable is the 10-year T-bond rate prevailing in the filing month deflated by the monthly Consumer 
Price Index.  Economic growth is measured as the residuals from the regression of real GNP growth rates on real 
interest rates, where real GNP is measured in 1996 prices, and real interest rate is the nominal 10-year T-bond yield 
deflated by the Consumer Price Index.  Equity volume is measured as the aggregate dollar volume of equity (in 
millions) issued in the filing month deflated by the Consumer Price Index.  Industry performance is the median 
returns of the firm’s industry in the filing year.  Firm size is the total assets of the firm as of the fiscal year end prior 
to filing date.  Dispersion in stock returns is the standard deviation of the issuing firm’s stock returns in days –240 to 
–40 relative to the filing date of the issue.  Asset specificity is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for firms 
in the machinery and equipment industry (SIC code between 3400 and 3999) and zero otherwise.  Market-to-book 
ratio is measured as the ratio of (book value of assets – book value of equity + market value of equity) to the book 
value of assets as of the fiscal year end prior to filing date.  T-statistics are presented in parentheses.  a, b, c represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.  The economic impact of each variable is presented as a 
percentage in italics.  For each variable, this is computed as the increase in the probability of conversion for a 
change in the variable from its median to either the 25th or 75th percentile (whichever leads to an increase in the 
probability), holding all other variables at their median.  The overall probability of conversion based on each 
regression model is also presented below each regression, and is computed at the median for all the variables. 
 
PANEL A:  Impact of Economy-wide Factors on the Probability of Conversion 
 Regressions 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Intercept 
- 0.0445 
(- 1.160) 
0.2992 
(30.230) 
0.3754 
(17.500) 
0.2867 
(29.530) 
- 0.0438 
(- 1.140) 
0.3609 
(16.550) 
Interest Rates 
0.0412
a
 
(8.910) 
18.9888 
   
0.0412
a
 
(8.880) 
19.6438 
 
Economic Growth  
- 0.4698
a
 
(- 4.480) 
9.1504 
   
- 0.3407
a
 
(- 3.050) 
6.4674 
Equity Volume   
- 0.0020
a
 
(- 4.610) 
9.0430 
  
- 0.0015
a
 
(- 3.160) 
6.1034 
Industry 
Performance 
   
0.0240 
(0.730) 
1.3068 
0.0126 
(0.420) 
0.7194 
0.0157 
(0.490) 
0.8561 
       
Probability of 
Conversion (%) 
27.1136 27.8865 29.1412 28.6599 27.2647 28.6172 
R2 0.1581 0.0453 0.0479 0.0013 0.1585 0.0688 
N 424 424 424 424 424 424 
 Table 6 (continued) 
 
 
PANEL B:  Impact of Economy-wide and Firm-specific Factors on the Probability of Conversion 
 Regressions 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Intercept 
0.6327 
(28.360) 
0.3533 
(9.000) 
0.6345 
(29.070) 
0.6645 
(26.560) 
0.3344 
(7.010) 
0.6668 
(26.510) 
0.6526 
(26.000) 
Firm Size 
- 0.0116
a
 
(- 4.850) 
0.4757 
- 0.0089
a
 
(- 3.970) 
0.3920 
- 0.0112
a
 
(- 4.790) 
0.4696 
- 0.0113
a
 
(- 4.770) 
0.4642 
- 0.0087
a
 
(- 3.890) 
1.5708 
- 0.0113
a
 
(- 4.760) 
0.4618 
- 0.0111
a
 
(- 4.740) 
0.4627 
Dispersion in 
Stock Returns 
- 11.7603
a
 
(- 15.930) 
23.5996 
- 10.9539
a
 
(- 15.860) 
23.6463 
- 11.5792
a
 
(- 16.000) 
23.7187 
- 11.4866
a
 
(- 15.540) 
23.0281 
- 10.9647
a
 
(- 15.840) 
26.4829 
- 11.5149
a
 
(- 15.560) 
23.0299 
- 11.4828
a
 
(- 15.740) 
23.4045 
Asset 
Specificity 
- 0.0148 
(- 0.890) 
0.0000 
- 0.0184 
(- 1.190) 
0.0000 
- 0.0182 
(- 1.110) 
0.0000 
- 0.0153 
(- 0.920) 
0.0000 
- 0.0185 
(- 1.200) 
0.0000 
- 0.0158 
(- 0.950) 
0.0000 
- 0.0184 
(- 1.130) 
0.0000 
Market-to-Book 
Ratio 
0.0017 
(0.450) 
0.3992 
0.0038 
(1.070) 
0.9575 
0.0031 
(0.840) 
0.7479 
0.0037 
(0.960) 
0.8681 
0.0031 
(0.880) 
3.2335 
0.0032 
(0.840) 
0.7583 
0.0036 
(0.940) 
0.8611 
Interest Rates  
0.0311
a
 
(8.370) 
14.5179 
  
0.0334
a
 
(7.020) 
6.3552 
  
Economic 
Growth 
  
- 0.3629
a
 
(- 4.400) 
6.0327 
 
0.0759 
(0.760) 
4.7016 
 
- 0.3186
a
 
(- 3.620) 
5.2701 
Equity Volume    
- 0.0010
a
 
(- 2.750) 
4.2470 
 
- 0.0010
a
 
(- 2.770) 
4.2723 
- 0.0005 
(- 1.370) 
2.2561 
Industry 
Performance 
    
- 0.0249 
(- 1.020) 
4.8584 
- 0.0236 
(- 0.900) 
1.0453 
- 0.0189 
(- 0.730) 
0.8549 
        
Probability of 
Conversion (%) 
31.7807 29.5429 31.1342 31.8116 7.2476 31.8874 31.2896 
R2 0.3997 0.4860 0.4264 0.4104 0.4879 0.4116 0.4296 
N 422 422 422 422 422 422 422 
 
  
